

Message Text

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00801 01 OF 03 120807Z

13

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 130889

R 120616Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1458

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 TEL AVIV 0801

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: EAID, IS

SUBJ: ISRAEL'S FY 1975 ASSISTANCE REQUEST

REF: A. STATE 020842

B. TEL AVIV 0582

1. SUMMARY: "GRAY PAPER" PROJECTS CUMULATIVE DEFICIT OF DOLS 1.4 BILLION IN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (BOP) IN CYS 1974 AND 1975, ON TWO ASSUMPTIONS: (A) THAT ISRAEL'S REQUESTS TO PURCHASE ABOUT DOLS 3 BILLION IN ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM USG WILL BE MET BY END OF 1975, AND (B) THAT ISRAEL WILL RECEIVE DOLS .2 BILLION IN EMERGENCY SECURITY ASSISTANCE, PLUS " REGULAR " AID PROGRAMS AGGREGATING ABOUT DOLS 400 MILLION PER YEAR. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT BOP IN 1974 MAY BE DOLS 550--600 MILLION BETTER THAN "GRAY PAPER" FORECASTS, WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE DEFICIT FORECAST FOR THAT YEAR. FOR 1975 MORE CAUTION IS APPROPRIATE; HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE CAPITAL INFLOW WILL BE MINIMUM OF DOLS 500 MILLION HIGHER THAN "GRAY PAPER" PROJECTS. ACCORDINGLY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE "GRAY PAPER" MAKES CONVINCING ECONOMIC CASE FOR ADDITIONAL AID BEYOND DOLS 2.2 BILLION EMERGENCY SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND REGULAR PROGRAMS; HOWEVER, WITHOUT DOLS 2.2 BILLION AND REGULAR PROGRAMS DEFICIT WILL OCCUR, AND RESERVES WILL DECLINE. WITH REGARD TO DOLS 2.2 BILLION EMERGENCY AID, SINCE ADMINISTRATION TOOK INITIATIVE TO REQUEST THESE FUNDS FROM CONGRESS, ISRAEL UNDERSTANBABLY EXPECTS TO RECEIVE THEM. I CONTINUE TO SEE MERIT IN EXTENDING LARGE COMPONENT OF THIS AID IN GRANT FORM (AT LEAST TO COVER COSTS OF EMERGENCY AIRLIFT), AND REITERATE MY RECOMMENDATION THAT WE DO CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00801 01 OF 03 120807Z

SO. EXTENSION OF THIS AID ON GENEROUS TERMS, IN ADDITION TO ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES, WOULD HAVE FAVORABLE POLITICAL IMPACT HERE. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL HAVE ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONS HERE AND IN THE CONGRESS. AN OVERLY LONG DELAY IN TRANSMITTING

FINAL DECISIONS RE DOLS 2.2 BILLION TO ISRAELIS MIGHT RUN RISK, OF, IN EFFECT, TRANSFERRING DECISION MAKING TO CONGRESS AS JUNE 30 DEADLINE APPROACHES. END SUMMARY

2. "GRAY PAPER" IS FIFTH IN SERIES OF GOI STATEMENTS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR USG FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE SINCE 1969. LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, IT EXAGGERATES REQUIREMENTS FOR AID. INDEED, NATURE OF THIS ANNUAL EXERCISE PROVIDES STRONG INCENTIVE FOR ISRAEL TO DO SO: BY ENLARGING ON MAGNITUDE OF DEFICIT IN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (BOP) ISRAEL MAKES ITS BEST CASE. WITH BENEFIT OF 20-20 HINDSIGHT WE CAN SEE THAT, WHILE ISRAEL CERTAINLY HAD REAL NEED FOR USG SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN 1970 AND 1971, THIS WAS NOT TRUE IN 1972 OR 1973, BEFORE OCTOBER 1973 WAR AGAIN RETURNED ISRAEL TO SITUATION OF GENUINE NEED. USG FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1973 WAR WAS ABOUT DOUBLE WHAT ISRAEL REQUIRED; IN EFFECT, USG ASSISTANCE OVER-COVERED BOP DEFICIT AND WENT TO BUILD RESERVES. AS DIRECT RESULT, FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES HAD QUADRUPLED (FROM MARCH 1970) TO DOLS 1.6 BILLION BY OCTOBER 1973.

3. BOP DATA IN "GRAY PAPER" SHOW THAT SURPLUS OF DOLS 741 MILLION IN 1973 IS EXPECTED TO TURN INTO DEFICIT OF DOLS 587 MILLION IN 1974, AND STILL LARGER DEFICIT OF DOLS 840 MILLION IN 1975. IF TRUE, AND USG ASSISTANCE REMAINS AS FORECAST IN "GRAY PAPER," THIS WOULD MEAN ISRAEL'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES WOULD DROP TO DOLS 1,225 MILLION AT END OF 1974, AND TO LESS THAN DOLS 400 MILLION BY END OF 1975. THESE PREDITIONS ASSUME THAT ALL EXISTING USG FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (AGGREGATING ABOUT DOLS 400 MILLION PER YEAR) WILL BE CONTINUED IN 1974 AND 1975 EXCEPT FOR PL 480, WHICH IS PROJECTED AT DRASTICALLY REDUCED LEVEL WHICH WOULD FINANCE ONLY TRADITIONAL AMOUNTS OF VEGETABLE OIL AND TOBACCO, BUT NO GRAINS. TOTAL USG FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ANTICIPATED IS ABOUT DOLS 1,250 MILLION IN EACH OF 1973 (INCLUDING DOLS 800 MILLION EMERGENCY SECURITY ASSISTANCE) AND 1.74, AND DOLS 1,000 MILLION IN 1975. FORECAST IMPLIES THAT AFTER UNPRECEDENTED (FOR ISRAEL) AMOUNT OF USG ASSISTANCE, THERE WILL STILL BE DEFICIT OF OVER DOLS 1.4 BILLION IN 1974 PLUS 1975 TAKEN TOGETHER.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 00801 01 OF 03 120807Z

4. THESE ESTIMATES ARE QUESTIONABLE; BUT JUST HOW FAR DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON USG MILITARY SALES TO ISRAEL. "GRAY PAPER" ESTIMATES ASSUME RECEIPT BY END OF 1975 OF ALL OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY PURCHASE REQUESTS, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND TOTAL ABOUT DOLS 3 BILLION FROM OCTOBER 6, 1973 ONWARD. SAPIR TOLD AMB ON JANUARY 11 THAT USG HAD THUS FAR APPROVED SALES LICENSES FOR DOLS 1,657 MILLION IN DEFENSE ORDERS, WHILE DOLS 1,250 MILLION IN REQUESTS WERE STILL UNDER DISCUSSIONS. SHORTFALL IN FORECAST OF SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR STRETCHOUT IN DELIVERY TIMES BEYOND END OF 1975 WOULD REDUCE PROJECTED DEFICIT OF DOLS 1.4 BILLION DURING CYS 1974-75. WASHINGTON AGENCIES CAN EVALUATE THIS BETTER THAN WE.

5. ASSUMPTION OF 25 PERCENT RISE IN VALUE OF CIVILIAN IMPORTS FOR 1974, ALL ATTRIBUTABLE TO INCREASED PRICES, IS DUBIOUS. IF WE ASSUME PRICE INCREASE OF ONLY HALF AS MUCH (WHICH IS CONSIDERABLE SINCE IMPORTS ORIGINATE IN WESTERN EUROPE AND U.S.), THIS WOULD REDUCE DEFICIT ON GOODS AND SERVICES BY MORE THAN DOLS 400 MILLION IN 1974 ALONE. PERHAPS DEPT HAS INFO WHICH WOULD SUPPORT GOI VIEW, BUT FROM OUR Vantage POINT THIS IS VERY SOFT ASSUMPTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00801 02 OF 03 120833Z

13
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
----- 131067
R 120616Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1459

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 TEL AVIV 0801

EXDIS

6. EXPECTATION THAT IMPORTS IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS WILL NOT RISE AT ALL DEPENDS MAINLY ON RATE OF DEMOBILIZATION; CIVILIAN DEMAND FOR GOODS IS PRESENTLY AT LOW LEVEL DUE TO MANY FINANCIAL PROBLEMS FACED BY POPULATION AS RESULT OF REDUCED INCOMES AND INCREASED TAXATION. THIS REDUCES DEMAND FOR IMPORTS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE IS SIGNIFICANT IMPORT COMPONENT IN DOMESTIC PRODUCTION. PRESENT INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT "GRAY PAPER" FORECAST OF RATE OF DEMOBILIZATION MAY BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC. ("GRAY PAPER" FORECASTS AVERAGE RESERVE MOBILIZATION LEVEL OF 80,000 FOR 1974, WHEREAS FIGURE WAS ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 175,000 AT BEGINNING OF YEAR. TO ATTAIN FORECASTED AVERAGE WILL REQUIRE RAPID PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND HENCE DEMOBILIZATION.) THUS DEMAND FOR IMPORTS MAY BE LOWER THAN ENVISAGED.

7. RATE OF DEMOBILIZATION WILL ALSO AFFECT EXPORTS, AND IN SAME DIRECTION AS IMPORTS. MOREOVER, BECAUSE OF DIVERSION OF MANPOWER AND PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY INTO DEFENSE PRODUCTION, RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR PRODUCING EXPORTS WILL BE PINCHED IN 1974. CONSEQUENTLY, FORECAST OF EXPORTS MAY WELL BE TOO OPTIMISTIC, ESPECIALLY IF RECESSION EVENTUATES IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND U.S. IT MAY BE PRUDENT TO REDUCE EXPORT TOTAL FOR 1974 BY DOLS 200 MILLION.

8. EFFECT OF FOREGOING SUGGESTED CORRECTIONS IS TO REDUCE PROJECTED 1974 DEFICIT ON GOODS AND SERVICES FROM "GRAY PAPER" ESTIMATES OF DOLS 3,120 TO AT LEAST DOLS 2,900, ON CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS. IF DEMOBILIZATION IS SIGNIFICANTLY SLOWER THAN INDICATED IN "GRAY PAPER," ANOTHER DOLS 100-DOL200 MILLION MAY BE

SUBTRACTED FROM THIS FIGURE. IF PETROLEUM PRICES DROP
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00801 02 OF 03 120833Z

FAIRLY EARLY IN YEAR, SUBTRACT AN ADDITIONAL DOLS 100
MILLION. ANY SHORTFALL IN DIRECT DEFENSE IMPORTS (ALMOST
ENTIRELY BOUGHT FROM U.S.) BELOW FIGURE OF DOLS 1,500
MILLION MUST ALSO BE SUBTRACTED.

9. HOWEVER, IT IS IN CAPITAL ACCOUNT WHERE WE FIND "GRAY PAPER"
MOST DEFICIENT. IT HAS BEEN USUAL PRACTICE IN PAST YEARS FOR ISRAEL
TO UNDERESTIMATE FUNDS IT CAN RAISE ON ITS OWN ACCOUNT. FOR 1974,
"GRAY PAPER" FORECASTS UNILATERAL TRANSFERS WILL BE DOLS 970
MILLION, DOWN FROM BOTH 1972 AND 1973. WE THINK THIS IS TOO PESSI-
MISTIC,
AND THAT BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS WILL BE
HIGHER THAN THESE ROCK-BOTTOM ESTIMATES; WE WOULD ADD DOLS
200 MILLION TO TOTAL.

10. BOND SALES ARE PROJECTED AT DOLS 400 MILLION FOR BOTH 1974
AND 1975 (AS AGAINST DOLS 500 MILLION IN 1973); WE EXPECT TO
SEE THESE FIGURES BETTERED. WHILE FALL-OFF IN BOND SALES MAY BE
USUAL OCCURRENCE AFTER WAR YEAR, WE ARE NOT IN USUAL TIMES,
AS ARAB MILITARY THREAT TO ISRAEL OBVIOUSLY CONTINUES. DURING
MEETING WITH AMB ON JAN 11, SAPIR AND HIS ADVISERS FELL INTO
OPEN DISAGREEMENT ON FORECAST FOR BOND SALES, WITH SAPIR SUG-
GESTING THEY WOULD REACH DOLS 500 MILLION IN 1974. ISRAEL UNDER-
STANDABLY PREFERS LOWER FIGURE FOR PRESENTATION IN "GRAY PAPER."
TOGETHER WITH OTHER LONG-TERM LOANS, WE BELIEVE GROSS INFLOW
ON LONG-TERM LOANS WILL BE AT LEAST DOLS 200 MILLION
HIGHER FOR BOTH 1974 AND 1975. THIS IS CONSERVATIVE
FIGURE; ISRAEL BONDS CONFERENCE JUST CONCLUDED IN ISRAEL
THIS WEEK HAS SET TARGET OF DOLS 1,000 MILLION IN SALES FOR
1974. WHILE THEY WILL HARDLY REACH THAT FIGURE, IN MY OPINION,
THEY WILL GET SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN HALFWAY THERE. SAM ROTHBERG,
THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN TOLD ME THEY WOULD RAISE 90 PERCENT
OF THEIR TARGET, SINCE THEY HAVE A FANTASTIC NEW RUBE-GOLDBERG
METHOD OF SELLING BONDS WHICH IS CATCHING ON LIKE HOT CAKES.
OTHER ISRAEL BOND DELEGATES HERE ECHO ROTHBERG'S OPTIMISM THOUGH
IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THESE ARE "SALESMEN" TYPES.

11. SUMMARIZING ABOVE, WE THINK THAT BOP IN 1974 WILL BE, ON
A CONSERVATIVE CALCULATION, DOLS 550-600 MILLION BETTER THAN
"GRAY PAPER" FORECAST SUGGESTS, WITH IMPROVEMENT COMING IN BOTH
CURRENT AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS. CAPITAL INFLOW IN 1975 SHOULD BE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 00801 02 OF 03 120833Z

ABOUT DOLS 500 MILLION HIGHER THAN "GRAY PAPER" FORECASTS. (WE
DO NOT HERE ATTEMPT TO FORECAST 1975 CURRENT ACCOUNT: BUT NOTE
THAT IT INCLUDES DOLS 1,100 MILLION IN DIRECT AND DOLS 450
MILLION IN INDIRECT DEFENSE IMPORTS.)

12. RESERVES: ISRAEL ADMITS TO DOLS 1,810 MILLION IN GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AT END OF 1973, BUT THIS CANNOT BE ALL. RESERVES ROSE STEADILY THROUGHOUT YEAR, AS FOLLOWS:

DECEMBER 1972	DOLS 1,230 MILLION
MARCH 1973	DOLS 1,445 MILLION
JUNE 1973	DOLS 1,519 MILLION
SEPTEMBER 1973	DOLS 1,607 MILLION
DECEMBER 1973	DOLS 1,810 MILLION

DONATIONS AND BOND SALES WERE GREATLY STIMULATED BY WAR, AND AS RESULT LARGE SUMS OF MONEY FLOWED INTO ISRAELI HANDS DURING LAST QUARTER. AS IN 1967, ISRAEL HAS UNDOUBTEDLY SET ASIDE IN SEPARATE ACCOUNTS PART OF THIS INCOME. GIVEN MAGNITUDE OF CAPITAL INFLOW STIMULATED BY WAR, WE GUESS THIS AMOUNT IS IN EXCESS OF DOLS 100 MILLION WHICH GOI HAS ADMITTED WAS PUT INTO SEPARATE TREASURY ACCOUNT AFTER 1967 WAR. A GOOD GUESS WOULD BE ABOUT DOLS 300 MILLION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00801 03 OF 03 120817Z

13
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
----- 130934
R 120616Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1460

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 TEL AVIV 0801

EXDIS

13. FOREIGN DEBT HAS INCREASED AT WORRISOME RATE IN LAST FEW YEARS, MAINLY AS RESULT OF TWO SOURCES OF BORROWING: ISRAEL BONDS AND USG FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. ONE UNFORTUNATE BYPRODUCT OF USG AID HAS BEEN TO PUSH UP ISRAEL'S FOREIGN DEBT FASTER THAN NECESSARY. IF THIS PROCESS CONTINUES FOR FEW MORE YEARS, ISRAEL MAY HAVE PERSUASIVE CASE FOR ADDITIONAL GRANT AID. HOWEVER, FOREIGN DEBT IS ON FAVORABLE TERMS, WITH OVER 90 PERCENT ON LONG-TERM. DEBT SERVICE, WHILE HEAVY IN ABSOLUTE TERMS, MUST BE ASSESSED ON BASIS ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO PAY, WHICH UP TO OCTOBER 1973 WAR WAS MORE THAN KEEPING PACE WITH RISE IN FOREIGN DEBT. DEBT SERVICE RATIO HAD BEEN DECLINING FOR OVER TEN YEARS, AND RELATIVELY ISRAEL'S SITUATION WAS BECOMING EASIER DESPITE HEAVY ABSOLUTE BURDEN. WAR HAS INTERRUPTED THIS TREND. DEBT SERVICE RATION (I.E. PRINCIPAL PLUS INTEREST PAYMENTS AS PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS PLUS UNILATERAL TRANSFERS) WILL AMOUNT TO ABOUT 19 PERCENT IN 1974 AND 22 PERCENT IN 1975, AS COMPARED WITH 26.9 PERCENT IN 1966 AND PEAK OF 29.2 PERCENT IN 1958.

FUTURE TRENDS IN DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS SHOULD BE STUDIED; HOWEVER, OWING TO GAPS IN OUR INFORMATION ON USG MILITARY CREDITS WE ARE NOT IN BEST POSITION TO DO SO.

14. CONCLUSION: IN BRIEF, "GRAY PAPER" DOES NOT MAKE CONVINCING ECONOMIC CASE FOR ADDITIONAL AID IN 1974 BEYOND \$2.2 BILLION IN EMERGENCY SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND "REGULAR" AID PROGRAMS AGGREGATING ABOUT \$400 MILLION PER YEAR. HOWEVER, WITHOUT \$2.2 BILLION AND REGULAR PROGRAMS, DEFICIT WILL OCCUR IN BOP AND RESERVES WILL DECLINE ACCORDINGLY. OUR ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION BOTH CATEGORIES OF ASSISTANCE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 00801 03 OF 03 120817Z

ISRAEL.

15. A SPECIAL WORD CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF THE \$2.2 BILLION. AT THIS POINT I DON MY POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC HAT. SINCE ADMINISTRATION TOOK INITIATIVE TO REQUEST THESE FUNDS FROM CONGRESS, ISRAEL UNDERSTANDABLY EXPECTS TO RECEIVE THEM. I ASSUME WE ARE CURRENTLY DISCUSSING MIX OF GRANT AND CREDIT. I FURTHER ASSUME IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT FORM IN WHICH \$2.2 BILLION IS EXTENDED WILL HAVE NOT ONLY MAJOR ECONOMIC IMPACT HERE (IN TERMS OF FUTURE DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS), BUT WILL ALSO AFFECT POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE HERE RE WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN MIDDLE EAST.

16. I HAVE SEVERAL TIMES URGED THAT SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF \$2.2 BILLION BE EXTENDED IN GRANT FORM AT EARLY DATE, AT MINIMUM, ENOUGH TO COVER COST OF EMERGENCY AIRLIFT. I BELIEVE FAILURE TO DO SO WILL BE AMISTAKE BOTH AS CONCERNS RELATIONS HERE AND WITH THE CONGRESS. SOME DELAY IN TELLING THE ISRAELIS FINAL DECISIONS RE DISPOSITION OF ENTIRE \$2.2 BILLION MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE TACTICAL MERIT. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO COST OF EMERGENCY AIRLIFT. I REPEAT MY RECOMMENDATION THAT WE GRANT APPROXIMATELY \$1 BILLION TO THE GOI IMMEDIATELY TO COVER THESE COSTS. AS CONCERNS OUR BROADER STRATEGY RE THIS MONEY, I HOPE WE WILL AVOID DELAYING FINAL NOTIFICATION TO THE ISRAELIS TOO LONG. IN MY OPINION, WE SHOULD STRIVE TO AVOID, AS THE JUNE 30 DEADLINE APPROACHES, GIVING THE APPEARANCE THAT CONGRESS IS FORCING ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE DECISIONS RE AID TO ISRAEL AND THEREBY IN EFFECT NULLIFYING THE ALMOST UNPRECEDENTED EXECUTIVE LATITUDE FOR DECISION MAKING WHICH EXISTS IN LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE \$2.2 BILLION.
KEATING

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, IMPORTS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, BONDS (SECURITIES)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974TELAV00801
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P740146-1190
From: TEL AVIV
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740268/abbrzajm.tel
Line Count: 320
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: A. STATE 020842 B. TEL AVIV 0582
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 AUG 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 AUG 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <12 DEC 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ISRAEL'S FY 1975 ASSISTANCE REQUEST
TAGS: EAID, MASS, IS, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005